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Why Progressives Need a (Minimally) Realist Theory of 
Truth 
by Darren Hibbs 
What is being asserted when one claims that a statement, proposition, or belief is “true”? This is 
the central question that concerns philosophers who investigate the nature of “truth.” It is 
important to distinguish this question from the question of whether we ought to believe that a 
statement, proposition, or belief is true. The latter question is about the nature of justification and 
knowledge. Consider the distinction between the following questions: 
1. What does it mean to assert that the proposition “The moon is smaller than the sun” is “true”? 
2. Is the moon smaller than the sun? 
 
To supply an answer to question (1), one must appeal to some general theory about the nature of 
truth rather than determining whether the particular claim about the moon is true. An answer to 
question (1) can be supplied without having any clue about the correct answer to the second 
question. To know what the term “true” means does not entail that one knows the truth-value of 
particular truth claims (other than statements about the meaning of “truth”). In answering 
question (2), one would appeal to various kinds of evidence to determine whether there are 
sufficient grounds for believing that the moon is smaller than the sun. Although questions (1) and 
(2) are different in kind, some philosophers have argued that the concept of “truth” in general 
cannot be understood in isolation from questions about the epistemic procedures employed to 
determine whether a belief is justified. That is, you cannot get a satisfactory answer to question 
(1) without appealing to the epistemic procedures employed in answering questions of type (2). 
Those who take this view offer what is known as an “epistemic” theory of truth. My aim is to 
illustrate a logical problem for those who employ a radical version of epistemic truth in 
conjunction with advocacy for societal change. The remainder of the paper will answer the 
following questions in order: 
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1. What are traditional philosophical accounts of truth like? 
2. What is the radical version of epistemic truth and how does it depart from these traditional theories? 
3. What is the problem with adopting the radical version of epistemic truth in conjunction with political 
or social advocacy? 
4. What adjustment to the radical theory of epistemic truth is required to avoid the problem? 
 
There are numerous competing theories that address the question of what it means for a 
proposition to be true. The most commonly held theory of truth throughout the Western 
philosophical tradition has been the correspondence theory of truth.1 According to a simple 
version of the theory, propositions are assertions about some portion of reality and a proposition 
is true if and only if it accurately represents the relevant portion of reality. On this view, truth 
consists in the agreement between the content of a proposition and the way the world is. 
Consider the earlier claim “The moon is smaller than the sun.” According to the correspondence 
theory, this proposition amounts to a mental or conceptual representation of reality. To say that 
the statement is true is to say that the representation accurately portrays some objective2 features 
of the world—namely that there are such things as the moon and the sun, and that the respective 
sizes of the objects are different in the right way. Prior to the 20th Century, most philosophers 
thought the theory was so obvious that no defense was required. It seemed uncontroversial to 
claim that human beings form judgments about the world and those judgments are true or false 
depending upon whether the world is accurately represented by those judgments. 
An alternative to the correspondence theory is the coherence theory of truth.3 According to the 
coherence theory, to say that a proposition is true is to say that it coheres with some specified set 
of propositions. Coherence theorists differ on the proper understanding of the term “cohere.” 
Some proponents define coherence as consistency. A proposition is true if and only if it is 
logically consistent with the specified set of propositions. A proposition “p” is consistent with a 
specified set of propositions if “p” and all the members of the set can be true simultaneously. 
Thus, to assert that “The moon is smaller than the sun” is true means that there are no other 
beliefs in the specified set that would have to be false if the statement about the moon were 
regarded as true. Others equate coherence with entailment. On this view, a true proposition is 
entailed by the specified set of propositions. For example, if I believe that “If P is true, then Q is 
true” and I also believe that “P is true”, “Q is true” is entailed by the first two beliefs. On this 
account, to say that a proposition is true is just to say it logically follows from the propositions 
that make up the specified set. Both explanations describe coherence as a logical relationship 
among a set of propositions. Coherence theorists also disagree about how to specify the set of 
propositions that provide the test for coherence. According to one view, the specified set of 
propositions includes those propositions that would be believed by human beings at the 
completion of a properly conducted inquiry. According to a second view, the specified set of 
propositions includes those propositions that would be believed by an omniscient being. Both of 
these methods describe the specified set as an idealized set in the sense that the propositions that 
are included have a special status compared to propositions that are not included; namely, that 
they have been justified by either the best inquiry we can conduct or they are believed to be true 
by an omniscient being. 
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Another alternative to the correspondence theory is the pragmatic account of truth.4 Pragmatists 
argue that true propositions are those that are useful in practice. But what does it mean to say that 
a belief is useful or successful in practice? Pragmatists offer different accounts of the type of 
utility that marks a true belief, but they generally agree that true beliefs are beneficial from a 
practical point of view. True beliefs are those that allow us to successfully organize, explain, and 
predict our experiences. Some pragmatists add that true beliefs are characterized by their 
resistance to experiential falsification. Thus, the pragmatist argues that truth is a matter of 
experiential validation and the latter is a matter of measuring the practical utility of beliefs. 
There are other theories of truth that have been proposed and there are several variations within 
the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic categories. But this brief sketch of the major 
theories provides a summary of what a theory of truth is supposed to accomplish. A common 
feature of the alternatives to the correspondence theory is that neither the coherence nor the 
pragmatic theorists explain truth as a relation between a proposition and an independent world 
existing apart from those propositions. Critics of the correspondence theory typically argue that 
the theory fails to adequately account for the nature of “correspondence.”5 Propositions and 
extra-mental entities are so radically different that symmetry between the two is impossible to 
articulate. For example, a proposition employing concepts of the moon and the sun is a 
fundamentally different kind of thing than the physical objects it represents. How can an 
arrangement of concepts “accurately portray” physical objects? If the precise nature of the 
correspondence relation cannot be satisfactorily explained, then the central component of the 
theory is deeply flawed. 
The difficulties with the correspondence theory led coherentists and pragmatists to drop the 
appeal to extra-mental reality in explaining the nature of truth. Although this step is a significant 
departure from the correspondence view, it does not amount to the rejection of the notion of 
objective reality or objective truth. For example, the coherence and pragmatic theories of truth 
may not appeal directly to the notion of objective reality to explain truth, but there is nothing in 
these theories that rules out appealing to objective reality to explain why there could be only one 
coherent set of beliefs or why progress seems to occur in the pragmatic sense of the usefulness of 
our beliefs.6 However, there are more radical critiques of the correspondence theory that 
explicitly challenge not only the truth-making role of “objective reality” in the theory, but the 
coherence of the notion of “objective reality” itself. The view that there is an objective, mind-
independent reality or fact is typically called “realism.” I am interested in a specific account of 
truth that accompanies critiques of realism and the logical consequences of adopting a view of 
this sort. I will now describe one such theory and then explain why those who adopt it undercut 
their ability to argue for the view that some states of affairs should be favored over others. 
Richard Rorty has criticized just about every concept that is either directly or indirectly 
associated with support for the correspondence theory of truth.7 His analyses of truth and related 
concepts have created an ongoing debate between supporters and critics.8 It is Rorty’s particular 
comments about the nature of truth that I wish to discuss.9 According to Rorty, when we come to 
believe that some proposition “p” is true, we do so as a result of following some procedure that 
leads us to accept “p” rather than reject it. Let’s call the procedure we follow an “Epistemic 
Procedure” (EP). There are many different EPs that can be employed to determine whether a 
proposition ought to be accepted as true (observing the world, a sophisticated scientific inquiry, 
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consulting experts, reading astrological charts, praying, etc.). However, there is no objective 
procedure for ranking EPs.10 For any advocate of a given EP—let’s say EP1—their verdict about 
the status of other EPs (EP2, EP3, and so on) will necessarily be a product of the method 
particular to EP1. That is, there is no transcendent perspective “outside” of all EPs that allows us 
to objectively rank them, since to rank them you will have to employ some particular EP. It 
follows that any ranking system of EPs will inevitably reflect the method of the EP used to 
establish the rankings. Thus, to claim that a particular proposition is true just means that it is 
endorsed by some way of thinking about what one ought to believe.11 Since particular truth 
claims are products of EPs and EPs cannot be ranked, the truth claims that follow from the EPs 
cannot be objectively ranked in terms of their plausibility either. 
Given this account of what it means to assert that a proposition is true, Rorty is logically 
committed to what I will call the Parity Thesis (PT). What does it mean to be logically 
committed to a proposition? Assume that someone holds the following two propositions to be 
true: (1) All A are B, and (2) All B are C. Someone committed to both (1) and (2) is logically 
committed to: (3) All A are C. PT follows in this way from Rorty’s view about putative “truths” 
and the EPs that generate them. PT is a form of relativism that holds all truth claims to be equally 
plausible, valid, or justified. According to PT, there is no way to objectively rank assertions in 
terms of their probability of being true because no claim has a privileged status over any other 
claim. No claim possesses a privileged status since all claims originate from EP’s that have no 
privileged status.12 
What is a progressive and why should they reject PT and the view of truth that generates it? 
Although the term “progressive” has an established meaning, I will use the term in a more 
expansive sense to refer to an advocate for change in political or social arrangements where the 
proposed change is described as an “improvement” over the current state of affairs. The 
stipulated meaning of the term does not necessarily relate to specifically liberal or conservative 
proposals. However, conservatives are unlikely to support PT since they typically hold some 
propositions to be objectively true. Rorty and some of his followers are progressives in the sense 
that they are advocates for a form of liberal democracy free of coercion as a superior form of 
social arrangement.13 According to Rorty, such an arrangement provides a congenial 
environment for open-minded discussion about the issues that concern us as human beings and, 
as such, it is superior to arrangements that do not. 
What is the problem with accepting PT if one is a progressive? First, there is the problem of 
explaining what could motivate a progressive to propose a change if they are logically committed 
to PT. Suppose that a progressive suggests that we alter some aspect of our society in order to 
improve conditions. Let’s call the current state of affairs (A). The progressive proposes that we 
make specific changes to (A) in order to bring about state of affairs (B) where (B) is offered as 
an improvement over (A). If PT is accepted, (B) is not an improvement over (A) since no truth 
claim can be established as objectively true. (B) may be offered as better given a certain EP, but 
(A) may also be offered as better on some other EP, and neither EP is objectively better than the 
other. If all states of affairs are justified by some EP, there can be no motivation for the view that 
we ought to become active in trying to bring about one state of affairs over any other state of 
affairs. Second, the progressive PT advocate cannot justify the claim that their proposals, if 
adopted, would constitute an improvement. If (A) and (B) cannot be objectively ranked in terms 
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of warrant, justification, or plausibility, then one cannot argue that either (A) or (B) is more 
reasonable or more justified than the alternative. Again, (B) may be justified given one EP, while 
(A) may be justified by some other EP, but neither EP is objectively better than the other. 
Holding a thoroughly relativist view of truth eliminates both the motivation for progressive 
proposals and the hope of justifying the claim that some states of affairs are objectively better 
than others.14 
The denial of PT is necessary in order to justify progressive proposals that aim to improve 
society. But what follows from the denial of PT? Rejecting PT does not entail that a full-blooded 
realism must be accepted. In fact, one can concede to the relativist that “truth” must be 
understood as a function of methods of justification or verification. I do not think this concession 
is necessary within the context of a discussion about “truth” in general. I only make the 
concession here to introduce a modest form of objectivism that avoids the problems associated 
with PT. At a minimum, denying PT entails that some propositions are better candidates for 
objective truths than others. This view requires the supposition that some EPs are objectively 
better than others at producing candidates for objective truths. This supposition amounts to the 
commonsense claim that some methods of inquiry are objectively better than other methods. 
Note that the supposition of objective rankings for EPs does not entail that we must be certain 
beyond any doubt that our ranking of EPs is objectively true. In other words, in order to pursue 
objective truth, we do not have to presuppose that we already possess it in terms of the methods 
we use to seek it. In fact, the pursuit of objective truth requires that we avoid a level of 
overconfidence that may prevent desirable adjustments to our methods of inquiry in light of new 
evidence or arguments. This view is a “Minimally Realist” account in the sense that it 
presupposes an objective ranking of EPs and their products—even though we may be wrong 
about how the ranking ought to be ordered at any given time. This view is compatible with the 
correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth.15 It is compatible with each because 
none of these theories require us to reject an objective ranking of EPs. It avoids the PT problem 
in the following way. If Rorty is challenged about why liberal democracy is superior to other 
forms of social arrangements, he cannot appeal to the superiority of the EP that produced his 
belief since he has already stated that his EP is no better than others. If he believed that there is 
an objective ranking of EPs, he would not be facing a question about why he is advocating a 
view produced by an EP that is no better than any other. The problem, ultimately, is about the 
internal logical coherence of advocating a proposal for improvement when saddled with the 
theory that the methods that produced it are on par with any other. Merely including the belief 
that there is an objective order of EPs deflects this type of objection.16 
I have tried to provide a general account of what a theory of truth is about and explain why a 
specific epistemic account of truth entails the Parity Thesis. The result is a form of relativism 
that delegitimizes progressive proposals for societal advancement. A modest proposal is that we 
ought to reject the Parity Thesis and the account of truth that supports it and adopt the view that 
some propositions are better candidates for being objectively true because they are produced by 
objectively better epistemic procedures. 
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